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Studying how children and adults explain magic tricks can reveal developmental
differences in cognition. We showed 167 children (aged 4–13 years) a video of a magician
making a pen vanish and asked them to explain the trick. Although most tried to explain
the secret, none of them correctly identified it. The younger children provided more
supernatural interpretations and more often took the magician’s actions at face value.
Combined with a similar study of adults (N = 1008), we found that both young children
and older adults were particularly overconfident in their explanations of the trick. Our
methodology demonstrates the feasibility of using magic to study cognitive development
across the life span.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Magic tricks depend on assumptions about the world. Magicians
skillfully violate these assumptions to create mysteries (Rensink
and Kuhn, 2014). Since assumptions change with age, magi-
cians perform differently for children and adults. Children, for
example, may prefer watching physical magic such as vanishing
objects, while adults can understand psychological magic such
as mind-reading. To keep performances suitable, magicians have
developed intuitions about which tricks work best for which
ages (e.g., Ginn, 2004; Kaye, 2005). Examining these intuitions
could lead to new insights or methods in the study of cognitive
development.
Scientists have leveraged magic to explore other areas in
psychology (Kuhn et al., 2008) including attention, perception,
decision-making, and problem solving. Some have used both
children and adults in their samples to compare cognitive devel-
opment (e.g., Subbotsky, 2001). Few, however, have explored
developmental differences with a large sample over a wide age
span. Combined with previous research on adults (Demacheva
et al., 2012), we present a feasibility study of 1175 participants
aged 4–90 years.
Due to their level of maturation, children have different expec-
tations and assumptions than adults; magicians thus cater to them
with a specific set of effects (Sharpe, 1988; Rissanen et al., 2014).
Around 4 years of age, children begin to understand that other
people have distinct beliefs and intentions—that is, they begin to
form a Theory of Mind (Apperly et al., 2009). Around the same
time, the distinction between appearance and reality becomes
clearer (Flavell, 2000). When executive attention develops around
3–7 years of age, logical thinking and sustained attention improve
(Posner and Rothbart, 2007). With these developments, children
are better able to make assumptions about what is going to
happen and thus become more receptive to magic tricks.
Magical beliefs—such as beliefs about the existence of events
which violate physical laws—also change with age (Subbotsky,
2014). Young children tend to believe in fantasy figures (such
as fairies; Phelps and Woolley, 1994; Woolley, 1997) and many
preschool children believe magicians have supernatural powers
(Evans et al., 2002). During school age, children start to develop
a more scientific perspective which can override magical beliefs
(Subbotsky, 2010). Even so, these beliefs can persist into adult-
hood. In one study, more than half of college students ascribed
psychic abilities to someone performing tricks resembling clair-
voyance and psychokinesis, even if he was introduced as an
amateur conjurer (Benassi et al., 1980). In another study, adults
who claimed not to believe in supernatural abilities were reluc-
tant to let the experimenter cast a spell on their identification
cards (Subbotsky, 2001). Though some magical beliefs decrease
with age, they continue to play an important role throughout the
life span (Subbotsky, 2014).
In this paper we present a preliminary study of magical beliefs
in children and adults. Participants watched a magician make
a pen vanish then they tried to explain the trick. This “non-
permanence magic” (Subbotsky, 2001) surprises most people
over 4 years old (Rosengren and Rosengren, 2007). We had three
hypotheses:
1. Confidence in one’s explanation of the secret will decrease with
age. This is consistent with magicians’ observations and with
studies showing that young children feel overconfident in their
cognitive abilities (Shin et al., 2007; Lipko et al., 2009).
2. Younger children (aged 4–8 years), compared to older ones,
will show more magical beliefs when explaining the trick (see
Phelps and Woolley, 1994).
3. Younger children (aged 4–5 years) will more often take
observed events at face value, since the appearance–reality
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distinction is still developing (Flavell, 2000). Specifically, they
will more often believe that the pen broke or dissolved in the
magician’s hands.
2. METHODS
The experimenter led participants to a testing room with individ-
ual computers. The participants watched a recorded magic trick,
tried to explain it, then rated their confidence in the explana-
tion. Next, the experimenter prodded for alternative explanations
using a questionnaire. Finally, participants explained the trick
again and re-rated their confidence level. The entire procedure
took under 30min for each participant.
2.1. PARTICIPANTS
We recruited 167 children from a summer camp in Montreal,
Canada. They were 8.8 ± 2.3 years old (mean ± SD, range 4–13)
and around half (54%) were male. Each age group had at least ten
participants (Table 1). The procedure conformed to the guide-
lines of the Jewish General Hospital Research Ethics Committee
and we obtained parental consent.
Previously we recruited a sample of 1008 participants 22.3 ±
6.6 years old (14–90, 31% male; see Table 1) which we used as a
comparison group (Demacheva et al., 2012). They completed an
analogous questionnaire online.
2.2. MATERIALS
2.2.1. Magic trick
The experimenter explained that we were studying how people
think about magic tricks. On a computer, a 15-s silent video clip
showed a magician making a pen vanish. In the video, the magi-
cian begins by showing a pen then appears to break it. When his
hands open, the pen has vanished (Figure 1; see Supplementary
Material for a video). We chose this minimal magic trick because
it can fool both children and adults without needing patter, inter-
action, or explicit social cues (Demacheva et al., 2012; cf. Joosten
et al., 2014). Participants could watch the video as many times as
they wanted. Throughout the study, the experimenter referred to
the magic trick in the video as a trick and avoided mentioning
“real magic.”
There are several methods of performing this trick. Here, the
secret involved the pen quickly moving inside the magician’s
jacket. A small cue in the video of an object hitting the magician’s
shirt hinted at this method. For a full description of the mecha-
nism behind the trick, see Wilson (1988, p. 279, “The Vanish of
the Handkerchief”).
2.2.2. Questionnaire
The experimenter then led the children through a questionnaire
(Appendix A in Supplementary Material); we used the same one
as Demacheva et al. (2012) after a developmental psychologist
adapted the wording for children. Most children tried to explain
the secret of the trick. A magician who was unaware of our
hypotheses later rated these explanations on a scale from 1 (i.e.,
completely wrong) to 5 (i.e., complete grasp of the method).
Children rated their confidence in the explanations on a simi-
lar 5-point scale (1: not at all, 2: a bit, 3: some, 4: a lot, 5: a
whole lot). The questionnaire then probed for alternative expla-
nations by asking about required materials and possible methods
to perform the trick. Some materials and methods were accurate
(e.g., rubber bands, the pen moves quickly to a different location)
and others were not (e.g., mirrors, the magician still holds the
pen but it cannot be seen). Finally, children revised their initial
explanations and re-rated their confidence.
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Consistent with our hypotheses, younger children gave more
supernatural interpretations, more often took the magicians’
actions at face value, and felt more confident in their explana-
tions. Inconsistent with our hypotheses, confidence also increased
with age among adults.
3.1. SECRET
Although most children (62%, CI [54, 69%]1) tried to explain the
secret, none correctly identified it. The magician gave 96% [92,
99%] of the initial explanations the lowest accuracy rating: com-
pletely inaccurate. (We considered the explanation correct if the
magician rated it 3 or more out of 5). Even after being probed for
alternative explanations, participants performed only marginally
better: 2% [0, 6%] guessed it correctly. Adults similarly had little
success in guessing the secret (5% were correct in their first expla-
nation and 9% in the second; Demacheva et al., 2012). The trick
was thus effective in that few people figured it out. We excluded
these few from the rest of the analyses.
3.2. EXPLANATIONS
Attempts to explain the trick were broad. The 4–6-year-olds
usually remarked the pen “just disappears” or the magician
“just breaks it.” Indeed, the younger children more often
took the magician’s actions at face value. Specifically, they
more often believed that the pen broke or dissolved in the
magician’s hands (Figure 2). Thus, age related to reports that
the pen broke (χ2(8) = 22.459, p = 0.004) or dissolved (χ2(8) =
25.54, p = 0.001)2. These reports largely flattened out after the
teenage years (Figure 2).
1Square brackets denote 95% confidence intervals (see Cumming, 2014).
2Statistical tests used data from participants 4–13 years old. Four and five-
year-olds were combined due to their small sample sizes (see Table 1).
Table 1 | Sample sizes and gender proportions for each age group.
Age 4–5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14–17 18–19 20–29 30–39 40+
N 10 20 31 22 17 23 16 18 10 37 225 655 62 29
% Male 10 35 55 86 35 65 56 72 40 46 25 30 55 52
Participants aged 13 and under completed the child version of the questionnaire; the rest did the adult version (Demacheva et al., 2012).
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FIGURE 1 | Participants watched a silent video of a magician making a pen vanish. For the video, see Supplementary Material.
FIGURE 2 | Percent of participants believing that the pen broke or
dissolved. The vertical line separates those who took the child vs. adult
version of the questionnaire. Shaded areas show bootstrapped 95%
confidence intervals.
The 7–9-year-olds began to develop possible yet implausi-
ble explanations. Some suggested the magician hid the pen in
his sleeves (which were rolled up in the video) or hid it in his
skin. Others suggested the pen crumbled into smaller and smaller
pieces until nothing remained. One suggested that the torso in the
video was actually a mannequin and the magician hid the pen in
the empty torso. The 10-year-olds and older children started to
develop plausible explanations, such as a trick pen, camera tricks,
or a hidden pocket. These progressive changes in the explanations
presumably reflect both increased verbal ability and cognitive
development.
Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Evans et al., 2002),
many of the younger children showed magical beliefs. Some sug-
gested that the pen vanished simply because “the pen is magic.”
When asked in the questionnaire, younger children more often
believed the secret involved superpowers or a magic potion (e.g.,
“there is secret invisible stuff on his hands that makes [the pen]
disappear”; Figure 3). There were thus relationships between
age and the frequency of beliefs that the trick used a potion
(χ2(8) = 24.008, p = 0.002) or superpowers (χ2(8) = 32.74, p <
0.001). The adult version of the questionnaire used different
wording (“chemical reaction” rather than “magic potion”) which
prevented a comparison to the children.
3.3. CONFIDENCE
Despite their lack of accuracy, children felt confident in their
explanations: 84% reported at or above the midpoint of
FIGURE 3 | Percent of participants believing that the magic trick
required a magic potion or superpowers. Shaded areas show
bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals.
FIGURE 4 | Confidence in one’s inaccurate explanation of the magic
trick. Shaded areas show bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals.
confidence. The majority (73%) reported “some” or “a lot” of
confidence in their explanation. Adults reported roughly similar
levels of confidence (57%).
Among children, confidence seemed to decrease with
age (Figure 4); there was a relationship between age and
confidence in the explanation of the trick (first explana-
tion: Kruskal-Wallis H(8) = 15.509, p = 0.05; second: H(8) =
19.176, p = 0.014). This general pattern is consistent with the
finding that younger children are particularly overconfident
(Lipko et al., 2009). Indeed, when presenting a deck of cards to
young children, magicians (e.g., co-authors JO and AR) often
hear, “Oh! I know that trick!.”
Among adults, confidence seemed to increase with age
(Figure 4). This seems inconsistent with findings that younger
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FIGURE 5 | Confidence in one’s inaccurate explanation of the magic
trick by gender. Shaded areas show 95% bootstrapped confidence
intervals.
adults are generally more overconfident than older ones (Pliske
and Mutter, 1996; Zell and Alicke, 2011). In our sample, gen-
der differences may have contributed to this effect. Some studies
have found that men are more overconfident in their abilities
than women (Barber and Odean, 2001; Bengtsson et al., 2005).
Our sample included more men as age increased above 18 (see
Table 1) and overall males were more overconfident than females
(Figure 5). The increase in males among older adults could
have likewise increased confidence at older ages. Still, this could
only explain part of the effect. Zell and Alicke (2011) found
an interaction between age and overconfidence depending on
which dimension was measured. For example, older adults were
more confident about their sociability but less so about their
athleticism. Perhaps, then, explaining magic tricks is a dimen-
sion showing more overconfidence with age. It remains unknown
whether similar results apply to other magic tricks or cognitive
tasks among adults.
3.4. LIMITATIONS
This study had three potential limitations. First, the ques-
tionnaires for children and adults differed slightly in wording
(compare Appendix A in Supplementary Material here with
Demacheva et al., 2012). Although we consulted a develop-
mental psychologist to help ensure analogous wording, differ-
ent results between children and adults could be partly due to
inconsistencies in wording. To account for this, we minimized
comparisons between those who took the child vs. adult ver-
sion of the questionnaire. Second, the magic trick was recorded
rather than performed live, which complicated the explanations
of the trick. When young children claimed that the pen dis-
solved or vanished, they could have either intended that the
pen actually vanished (in reality) or simply that it appeared
to vanish (in the video); we could not differentiate these with
certainty. Third, our methodology was insensitive to differ-
ent interpretations of other questionnaire items. For example,
when asked whether the trick needed “superpowers,” perhaps
some children thought of supernatural abilities while others
thought of specialized skills. One potential solution would be
to perform the trick live each time followed by a more in-
depth interview; in our case, this would have prevented such a
large sample.
3.5. IMPLICATIONS
Using magic tricks may have several advantages for studying cog-
nitive development across the life span. Traditional illusions in
developmental psychology often require props such as boxes,
screens, or backdrops (e.g., Baillargeon, 2002). These illusions can
make the prop itself seem magical, such as when transforming
objects inside a special box (e.g., Subbotsky, 2004). Using magic,
as in the current study, the experimenter can make a person look
magical rather than a prop. Shifting the locus of magic from props
to people could help clarify differences in the development of
magical beliefs regarding people vs. objects.
Further, unlike many of the illusions used to test phenomena
like object permanence, magic tricks are robust across age: they
amaze a large majority of people (here, 95%) over a wide age
span. Many tricks work in diverse environments (e.g., Kuhn and
Tatler, 2005) and can be translated for use in controlled experi-
ments (Danek et al., 2014; Olson et al., 2015). Children and adults
can thus view the same stimuli, which allows researchers to make
more direct comparisons across different age groups. Such com-
parisons may be particularly useful to examine phenomena like
magical beliefs or overconfidence which change their presenta-
tion across the life span (Benassi et al., 1980; Woolley, 1997; Zell
and Alicke, 2011; Subbotsky, 2014). Similarly, magic tricks work
across different cultures (Kiev and Frank, 1964) and thus could
shed light on intercultural differences in magical beliefs.
In sum, our feasibility study demonstrated a method to test
developmental hypotheses with large and diverse samples. Such
a method combining video stimuli and online surveys is par-
ticularly useful to explore age-based changes in magical beliefs
and overconfidence in children and adults. Magic may thus offer
a useful tool to gain new insights in developmental psychology
across the life span.
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